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Abstract
A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quan-
tum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature
of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are real-
ists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function?
What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these ques-
tions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about
quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist
interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological
interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation.
For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
Keywords: quantum mechanics, wave function, quantum state of the universe, sci-
entific realism, measurement problem, configuration space realism, Hilbert space realism,
multi-field, spacetime state realism, laws of nature
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is one of the most successful physical theories to date. Not
only has it been confirmed through a wide range of observations and experiments,
but it also has led to technological advances of a breathtaking scale. From electronics
and optics to computing, the applications of quantum mechanics are ubiquitous in
our lives.
As much as it has given rise to technological innovations, the meaning of quan-
tum mechanics remains elusive. Many curious features of quantum mechanics, such
as entanglement, non-locality, and randomness, are taken to be prima facie challenges
for a clear understanding of quantum mechanics. These puzzles are related to the
wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. Understanding the meaning
of quantum mechanics seems to require a good understanding of the meaning of
the wave function.
What does the wave function represent? That is the main concern of this sur-
vey article. The answer to that question is complicated by the fact that the wave
function does not look like anything familiar. It is a function defined on a vastly
high-dimensional space, with values in complex numbers, and unique only up to
an “overall phase.” Nevertheless, we have devised many ways of using wave func-
tions in making predictions and explaining phenomena. We use wave functions
to calculate the probabilities of microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of physical
systems. These led to the successful explanations of the double-slit experiment,
the Stern-Gerlach experiment, and the stability of the hydrogen atom. The wave
function is indispensable for making these predictions. However, the predictions
are probabilistic. (More on this later.)
Roughly speaking, there are three main views about the wave function:
Instrumentalism: The wave function is merely an instrument for making empiri-
cally adequate predictions.
Epistemicism: The wave function merely represents the observer’s uncertainty of
the physical situation.1
Realism: The wave function represents something objective and mind-independent.
1The recently published theorem of Pusey et al. (2012) shows that a certain class of epistemic
interpretations of the wave function are incompatible with the empirical facts.
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In this article, I focus on the realist interpretations of the wave function. They
seem to be the most interesting and promising ways of understanding quantum
mechanics.
Let me make four remarks. First, the meaning of the wave function is related to
solutions to the quantum measurement problem. Hence, we will start in §2 with an
introduction to that problem, along with some mathematical preliminaries. Second,
I left the definition of realism open-ended. That is because we will consider proposals
for specific versions of realism about the wave function. The proposals are grouped
into three categories: ontological interpretations (§3), nomological interpretations
(§4), and the sui generis interpretation (§5). Third, because of the prevalence of
quantum entanglement, “the wave function” should be understood to refer to the
wave function of the universe, or the universal wave function. The wave functions
of the subsystems are thought to be derivative of the universal one. Fourth, for
simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic versions of quantum mechanics.2
The issues taken up here are continuous with the general question about how
to interpret physical theories. They offer concrete case studies for scientific realism,
and they might be useful for philosophers of science, metaphysicians, and anyone
with an interest in understanding quantum mechanics.
2 Background
In this section, we will review some basic facts about the wave function and its
connection to probabilistic predictions. We will then consider the quantum mea-
surement problem and three realist theories that solve it. The upshot is that the
wave function occupies a central place in their descriptions of physical reality.
2.1 The Wave Function
It will be useful to have a brief review of classical mechanics. To describe a classical
mechanical system of N particles, we can specify the (three-dimensional) position
qi and the (three-dimensional) momentum pi of each particle in physical space
(represented by R3). We can represent the classical state of an N-particle system
in terms of 6N numbers, 3N for positions and 3N for momenta. The classical state
can also be represented as a point in an abstract state space called the phase space
R6N. Once we specify the forces (or interactions) among the particles, they evolve
deterministically, by the Hamiltonian equations of motion:
∂qi
∂t
= ∂H
∂pi
,
∂pi
∂t
= −∂H
∂qi
, (1)
where H stands for the Hamiltonian function on the phase space, which is a short-
hand notation that encodes classical interactions such as Newtonian gravitational
potential and Coulomb electric potential. The Hamiltonian equations are differen-
2For complications that arise in the relativistic theories, see Myrvold (2015).
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tial equations, and the changes in the particles are obtained from taking suitable
derivatives of H. In this sense, H is the generator of motion. For every point in
phase space, H generates a curve starting from that point. In other words, for every
initial condition of the N particle system, H determines the future trajectories of the
particles.
Now let us introduce the quantum mechanical way of describing a system of N
“particles.”3 Instead of describing it in terms of the positions and the momenta of
N particles, we use a wave function for the system. The wave function represents
the quantum state of the system. In the position representation, the wave function,
denoted by ψ(q), is a particular kind of function from configuration space R3N to
complex numbers C. Let us elaborate on this definition:
• Domain: the domain of the wave function ψ is R3N, or N copies of physical
space R3. N is the total number of particles in the system. When N is large,
R3N is vastly high-dimensional. Each point in R3N is an N-tuple (q1, ...,qN).
Each qi corresponds to particle i’s position in physical space R3. Hence, the
N-tuple lists the positions of N particles. We use a point in R3N to represent
a particular configuration (arrangement) of N particles in R3. Hence, R3N is
called the configuration space.4 The wave function ψ(q1, ...,qN) is a function
whose domain is the configuration space, which is vastly high-dimensional
when the system has many particles.
• Range: the range of the wave function ψ, in the simplest case, is the field of
complex numbers C. A complex number has the form a + bi, where i = √−1;
in polar form, it is Reiθ, where R is the amplitude and θ is the phase.5
• Restrictions: the wave function is a particular kind of function from R3N to C.
It has to be a “nice” function that we can take certain operations of integration
and differentiation.6
• Abstract state space: each wave function describes a quantum state of the
system. The space of all possible quantum states is called the state space of
quantum mechanics. The state space will include all possible wave functions
for the system, that is, all the “nice” functions from configuration space R3N
to complex numbers C. Hilbert space is the abstract mathematical space that
3In some ways of thinking about quantum mechanics, particles are not fundamental. Hence the
quotation marks.
4This is the ordered configuration space, in which a permutation of the particle labels creates
a different configuration. If the particles are indistinguishable, then it is more natural to use the
unordered configuration space, NR3. This has implications for the nature of the wave function. See
Chen (2017) and the references therein.
5If we include spinorial degrees of freedom, the range is Ck. We set spins aside in this paper.
6It has to be “square-integrable.” That is, if we take the square of the amplitude of the wave
function value at every point, and integrate over the entire configuration space, we will get a finite
value. This is to ensure that we can normalize the squared value of the wave function to 1 so that it
has meaningful connections to probabilities. To ensure that we can take suitable derivatives on the
wave function, we often also require the wave functions to be sufficiently smooth.
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we use to describe such a state space. Hilbert space can be a high-dimensional
vector space, in which each wave function is represented as a vector.
In classical mechanics, the state of a system is represented by the positions and
the momenta of N particles (a point in phase space) that change deterministically
according to (1). If the wave function represents the quantum state of a system at
a time, how does it change over time? It obeys another differential equation called
the Schrödinger equation:
ih̵
∂ψ
∂t
= Hˆψ, (2)
where i is the complex number
√−1, h̵ is the Planck constant divided by 2pi, and Hˆ
is the Hamiltonian operator that encodes the energy and fundamental interactions
in nature. It is also deterministic: given any vector in Hilbert space, the Schrödinger
equation (2) produces a determinate curve in Hilbert space. Another feature of (2) is
that it is linear: if ψ1 and ψ2 are solutions to the equation, then their linear combina-
tions are also solutions to the equation. A surprising consequence of linearity is that,
in the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment, the system can be in a “superposition”
of two macroscopically distinct states:
Ψ = 1√
2
ψalive + 1√
2
ψdead (3)
A cat in this quantum state is not alive, and it is not dead. The linear Schrödinger
equation (2) ensures that the wave function of the system will not change into ψalive
(the cat is alive and the atom has not decayed) or ψdead (the cat is dead and the
atom has decayed). Thus, the Schrödinger equation does not determine a unique
experimental outcome. To resolve this, textbook quantum mechanics supplements
the Schrödinger equation with additional collapse postulates. Whenever we open
the box and “observe” the cat, the system will suddenly change (collapse) into one of
the two states: ψalive or ψdead. An important role of the wave function is determining
the probabilities of experimental outcomes, which are taken to be the results of wave
function collapses. For example, the probability of finding the system in any set of
configurations is given by the Born rule:
P(q ∈ A) = ∫
A
∣ψ(q)∣2dq, (4)
where A is a set of points in configuration space, ∣ψ(q)∣2 is the squared amplitude
of the wave function, and dq is the Lebesgue measure on R3N. In the cat example,
the probability of finding the cat to be alive is equal to 12 , since ∫ ∣ 1√2ψalive∣2 + 0 = 12 .
The Born rule has the consequence that wave functions that differ only by an overall
phase (multiplied by a complex number eiθ, where θ ∈ [0,2pi]) will give rise to the
same observable phenomena (∣ψ∣2 = ∣eiθψ∣2). That is called the overall phase symmetry,
which motivates the common view that two wave functions that differ by an overall
phase represent the same quantum state.
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2.2 The Quantum Measurement Problem
Notwithstanding the empirical success of quantum mechanics, the collapse postu-
lates introduce a host of difficulties. If the wave function (of the system and the
measurement device) obeys the Schrödinger equation, how can it also obey the
collapse postulates that contradict the linearity of the Schrödinger equation? But
if the wave function does not collapse, how can we obtain unique experimental
outcomes? In short, we have the quantum measurement problem:
(P1) The wave function is the complete description of the physical system.
(P2) The wave function always obeys the Schrödinger equation.
(P3) Every experiment has a unique outcome.
Each of these three propositions is, on its own, plausible. However, together they
lead to a contradiction. To see the contradiction, let us apply them to Schrödinger’s
cat thought experiment. If P1 is true, the system is completely described by (3). If
P2 is true, the wave function never collapses into one of the definite states. If P3 is
true, the cat is nonetheless in one of the definite states—either alive or dead.7
Since P1—P3 are inconsistent, at least one of them is false. Rejecting P1 or P2
would require us to develop alternative theories of quantum mechanics, since we
would need to find additional variables omitted by the wave function, or we would
need to modify the Schrödinger equation. Rejecting P3 would lead to major revisions
of our assumptions about the world. There are three main “interpretations” of
quantum mechanics that carry out such strategies. They all contain significant
revisions of quantum mechanics, so we should call them realist theories of quantum
mechanics instead of interpretations.
First, the de Broglie-Bohm theory, or Bohmian mechanics (BM), rejects P1. Ac-
cording to BM, the wave function is not the complete description of the physical
system. There are actual particles with precise positions in physical space. The
wave function still obeys the Schrödinger equation. But the wave function also
determines the velocity of the particles according to the guidance equation.8 In the
cat example, the cat is made out of particles in physical space. There is always a
determinate configuration of particles, so the cat is either alive or dead. The prob-
abilities of quantum mechanics become (more or less) epistemic uncertainties over
7For a more thorough discussion about the quantum measurement problem, see Myrvold (2017),
Albert (1992), and Bell (1990).
8The particles move according to the guidance equation:
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
∇iψ
ψ
, (5)
where Qi and mi are the position and mass of particle i, Im means taking the imaginary part, and∇i means taking the gradient with respect to the i-th particle. The particles are initially distributed
according to the Born rule, and their distribution will always agree with the Born rule because of the
mathematical properties of the Schrödinger equation and the guidance equation.
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initial particle configurations.9
Second, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theories of spontaneous collapse (GRW) re-
ject P2. According to GRW theories, the wave function ψt does not always obey
the Schrödinger equation. It undergoes spontaneous collapses with a fixed rate per
particle per unit time. In the cat experiment, given the vast number of particles
in the system, it will quickly collapse into a determinate state in which the cat is
either alive or dead. Collapses are represented by Gaussian functions with a fixed
width in physical space. Due to entanglement, collapses on a single particle has the
effect that the universal wave function will collapse into a definite state.10 On the
macroscopic scale, the collapse will give rise to (approximately) Born rule probabil-
ities. Each version of GRW postulates specific values for the collapse rate and the
Gaussian width. Moreover, there can be additional variables representing ontology
in physical space. GRWm adds a mass-density ontology that specifies the amount of
mass in physical space by a real-valued function m(x, t), where (x, t) is a space-time
point.11 In contrast, GRWf adds a flash ontology that postulates the existence of
space-time events at the center of the Gaussian function. It can be represented as a
function F(x, t) with x ∈ R3 and F(x, t) = 1 if (x, t) is the center of some GRW collapse
and 0 otherwise.12
Third, many-worlds interpretations of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM)
reject P3.13 According to these interpretations, there is no need to ensure that there
is a unique outcome in the cat experiment. There simply are two branches of the
wave function, one in which the cat is alive and the atom has not decayed and the
other in which the cat is dead and the atom has decayed. Both branches co-exist.
Because of a property called decoherence, the branches do not interfere much with
each other. The branches of the wave function are emergent worlds, the wave
function is the complete description of the “multi-verse,” and it always obeys the
Schrödinger equation. Similarly to GRWm, we can devise a version of EQM with
a mass-density ontology. This is called Sm and was first proposed by Allori et al.
(2010). A challenge for any version of EQM is how to make sense of probability in
a world in which every possible outcome of every quantum experiment happens
with certainty.14
9For a survey of BM, see Goldstein (2017); for the original paper, see Bohm (1952); for a modern
version, see Dürr et al. (1992).
10Representing collapses by Gaussian functions gives rise to the “tails problem.” See Ghirardi
(2018) §12 and the references therein.
11The mass-density function is defined from the wave function:
m(x, t) = N∑
i=1 mi ∫R3N d3x1...d3xNδ3(xi − x)∣Ψt(x1, ...,xN)∣2 (6)
12For a survey of GRW, see Ghirardi (2018); for the original paper, see Ghirardi et al. (1986); Bell
(2004), Ch 22, contains a clear presentation of the theory.
13The many-worlds interpretations are popular among Everettians. However, Conroy (2012) has
provided textual evidence that it is possible to understand Everett as endorsing a single-world
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
14For a survey of EQM, see Vaidman (2018); for the original paper, see Everett III (1957); for an
updated book-length development of the theory, see Wallace (2012). There has been significant
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The upshot is that the wave function figures prominently in all three realist quan-
tum theories. In BM, although the wave function is not the complete description of
the system, it is still part of the description. Moreover, the wave function guides
particle motion. In GRW, the wave function collapses and gives rise to unique out-
comes of experiments. In (many-worlds interpretations of) EQM, the wave function
never collapses but gives rise to emergent parallel worlds. For quantum theories
with additional ontology, such as BM, GRWm, GRWf, and Sm, the wave function
is also tied to the dynamics of the additional ontology. But their relationship is
different in these theories. Bohmian particles have independent dynamics: even
if the wave function were not to change, Bohmian particles would still move in a
non-trivial fashion. That is not the case in GRWm, GRWf, and Sm. Had there been
no change to the wave function, the additional ontology would not change either. It
is in this sense that the dynamics of mass-densities and flashes are not independent
of the dynamics of the wave function.
3 Ontological Interpretations
In this section, I review four ontological interpretations of the wave function. How-
ever, the label “ontological” could be misleading. These four interpretations share
the feature that the wave function is interpreted as part of the fundamental material
ontology, on a par with particles, fields, space-time events or properties, which are
the kind of microscopic things that make up macroscopic objects such as tables and
chairs. In §4 and §5, we will review nomological interpretations and the sui generis
interpretation of the wave function, which are compatible with the position that the
wave function is part of the ontology but just not in the same ontological category
as particles or fields.
3.1 A Field on a High-Dimensional Space
According to the first ontological interpretation, the fundamental space is a high-
dimensional space, and the wave function is a field in that space. This was intro-
duced by Albert (1996). Albert calls this view wave function realism.15 However,
as we shall see in the later sections, that label is no longer appropriate given the
abundance of other approaches that are also realist about the wave function.
It is counterintuitive how the fundamental space can be high-dimensional. It
might help to compare this idea with something familiar—classical physics. In
classical field theories such as Maxwellian electrodynamics, electromagnetic fields
are fields on the four-dimensional physical space-time. A field on physical space-
progress in addressing the probability challenge with the tools of typicality, decision theory, and
self-locating probabilities. For some recent examples, see Barrett (2017), Wallace (2012), Sebens and
Carroll (2016), and the references therein.
15It has been developed and defended by Loewer (1996), Ney (2012, 2013), and North (2013),
although North is primarily concerned with the first part of the thesis, i.e. the fundamental space is
a high-dimensional space.
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time can be interpreted as an assignment of monadic properties (field strength
and direction) to each point in space-time. Such an assignment is contrained by
Maxwell’s equations and certain boundary conditions.
In a similar way, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical field. How-
ever, the wave function cannot be interpreted as a field on physical space, as its
domain is the high-dimensional configuration space, represented byR3N. If we take
configuration space to be the fundamental space, then the wave function can be in-
terpreted as a field that assigns properties to each point in configuration space. The
properties assigned by the field, represented as complex numbers, change accord-
ing to the Schrödinger equation. On this view, the high-dimensional configuration
space is ontologically prior to physical space(time), and the latter somehow comes
out of the fundamental structure. This is despite the fact that we call the high-
dimensional space “configuration space,” which seems to imply the reverse order
of ontological dependence.16
The high-dimensional field interpretation prioritizes the structure of the wave
function and its dynamics. The fundamental physical events are those that happen
on the high-dimensional space. A key challenge to this view is to explain our
apparent experiences in a three-dimensional space. That is not just a question about
recovering the manifest image, but it is also about whether such an interpretation of
quantum mechanics can be “empirically coherent,” in the sense that if our evidence
for quantum mechanics comes from instrument readings in the three-dimensional
space, the theory should not undermine such evidence. It should explain how
the appearances of three-dimensional objects come out of the high-dimensional
fundamental space.17
Albert (1996) suggests that the explanation lies in the dynamics—in the structure
of the Hamiltonian operator. Although all the 3N dimensions are metaphysically
16There are three versions of this view:
• Bohmian version: the fundamental space is represented by R3N. The fundamental ontology
consists in a point particle located in that space and a field that assigns properties to points
of that space. The field always evolves by the Schrödinger equation. The point particle
moves along in the field according to the guidance equation, much like corks move along
in a river. Here we see a dis-analogy with the classical field. In classical physics, the field
and the particles satisfy the action-reaction principle; the fields and the particles can influence
each other. In Bohmian mechanics, the wave function interpreted as a field can influence the
particles but not the other way around.
• GRW version: the fundamental space is represented by R3N. The fundamental ontology
consists in a field that assigns properties to points of that space. The field evolves by the
Schrödinger equation most of the time but sometimes collapses by the GRW collapse mecha-
nism.
• Everettian version: the fundamental space is represented by R3N. The fundamental ontology
consists in a field that assigns properties to points of that space. The field always evolves by
the Schrödinger equation.
The high-dimensional field interpretation of the wave function is incompatible with GRWm, GRWf,
or Sm.
17See Barrett (1999) and Barrett (1996).
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on a par: {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, ..., q3N−2, q3N−1, q3N} (7)
the Hamiltonian operator has a term that encodes fundamental interactions and it
takes on a particular form:
∑∑
1≤i< j≤N Vi j[(q3i−2 − q3 j−2)2 + (q3i−1 − q3 j−1)2 + (q3i − q3 j)2] (8)
The Hamiltonian operator groups the coordinates in the 3N-dimensional configura-
tion space into triplets, such that there might be emergent objects that have the same
functional profile as what we take to be ordinary objects in the 3-dimensional space.
This provides reasons to believe that there might be an emergent 3-dimensional
physical space. For a discussion of Albert’s proposed explanation of emergence,
see Monton (2002), Lewis (2004), Ney (2012), Chen (2017), Emery (2017), and Ney
(2017).
Maudlin (2013) criticizes the high-dimensional field interpretation on the ground
that it reifies redundant structure. The common view (§2.1) holds that two wave
functions that differ only by a multiplicative constant represent the same physical
state. But if we interpret the wave function as a field that assigns numbers (that
represent physical magnitudes) to points in configuration space, then we would
distinguish two wave functions related by a constant, for the numbers assigned to
the points are different.18
3.2 A Multi-field on Physical Space
The high-dimensional field interpretation of the wave function faces difficulties,
primarily because it privileges configuration space over physical space. There are
many good reasons to take physical space to be ontologically more basic. First, it
underlies many important symmetries in physics. Second, it is much easier for a the-
ory to be empirically coherent if it does not undermine the relative fundamentality
of physical space(time).
These difficulties are avoided in the second ontological interpretation, according
to which the fundamental space is the ordinary physical space(time). On this
view, the wave function is not a field in the traditional sense, but a multi-field
on physical space. (See Forrest (1988), Belot (2012), Chen (2018a, 2017), Hubert
and Romano (2018).) A multi-field is similar to a field. However, unlike fields,
multi-fields assign properties not to individual points but to regions of points in
space. Such regions can be connected or disconnected. Mathematically, the wave
function is a function from N copies of R3 to complex numbers. Instead of thinking
of it as a field that assigns properties to every point in R3N, we can think of it
18This problem can be avoided if we adopt an intrinsic (or gauge-free) characterization of the wave
function, in terms of comparative relations that are invariant under any change by a multiplicative
constant. On the comparativist view, the fundamental structure consists in not monadic properties
but comparative relations holding between points of the high-dimensional space. See Chen (2018a)
for a proposal.
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as a “multi-field” that assigns properties to every region of R3 that is composed
of N points. The multi-field interpretation is a more faithful representation for
“indistinguishable particles,” for which particle labels do not matter. This is because
spatial regions understood as N-element subsets of R3 (or mereological fusions of
N points in R3) are unordered. Thus, the multi-field interpretation has the additional
advantage of automatically enforcing what is called “permutation invariance”: mere
permutations of a configuration of N particles do not change the physical state.
3.3 Properties of Physical Systems
The third ontological interpretation, proposed by Wallace and Timpson (2010), af-
firms the (relative) fundamentality of the physical space(time). On this view, we
assume that the universe has a compositional structure, i.e. it is divided into sub-
systems that occupy some spatial-temporal regions.19 Larger systems can be made
out of unions of smaller systems. And the universe is the union of all systems.
Although not every system has a wave function (because of entanglement), we
can still associate to each system a determinate property represented by what is
called a density matrix. A density matrix encodes much dynamical information of
the system.20 This view was introduced as an alternative to the high-dimensional
field interpretation. It is also an alternative to the low-dimensional multi-field in-
terpretation. However, it is still a version of realism about the wave function, since
the universal wave function (or the universal density matrix) is to be found in the
ontology—the property of the entire universe.
Wallace and Timpson call this approach spacetime state realism. Compared to the
field interpretations in §3.1 and §3.2, spacetime state realism seems more minimal,
in the sense that it is neutral with respect to the specific structures of quantum
theories. As long as the quantum theory comes with a compositional structure
(a decomposition of larger systems into smaller systems), we have a well-defined
procedure of ascribing properties to physical systems. They argue that it also has
significant advantages in handling relativistic invariance. See Swanson (2018) for
some discussions about the relativistic extensions.
A question about spacetime state realism is whether the fundamental ontology
19This assumption is important and can turn out to fail in some theories. For the Everettian
interpretation according to which the quantum state or the wave function represents everything
there is, the compositional structure may need to be emergent and is certainly not fundamental. See
§3.4 for a discussion of that possibility.
20For example, if the universe consists in two systems A and B, and if their joint quantum state is
this: ∣ΨAB⟩ = 1√
2
(∣α⟩A ∣β⟩B − ∣β⟩A ∣α⟩B) (9)
then the density matrix associated with system A (called the reduced density matrix) will be:
ρA = 12(∣α⟩A ⟨α∣A + ∣β⟩A ⟨β∣A) (10)
On this view, ∣ΨAB⟩ and ρA are understood as representing intrinsic properties of the systems or the
space-time locations of the systems.
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contains redundant structure. If we help ourselves to a decomposition of the uni-
verse into subsystems, and if we have the quantum state of the universe, then we
can obtain density matrices of the subsystems by a purely mathematical procedure
of tracing out the environmental degrees of freedom. Since they can be derived from
the quantum state of the universe, the properties of the subsystem need not be placed
in the fundamental ontology. Hence, spacetime state realism is in tension with the
principle of parsimony that we should minimize postulating more fundamental
structure than we need. If we get rid of the subsystem properties and only keep the
universal property (the universal density matrix), then this approach would be in
the same spirit as the low-dimensional multi-field approach in §3.2. However, if one
is interested in finding the most perspicuous interpretation (as suggested by Wallace
and Timpson), and not the adequate ontology that is the most parsimonious and
simple, perhaps space-time state realism is the right choice. On the other hand, one
might object that an ontology of properties represented by density matrices, which
is not metaphysically impossible, may be much less perspicuous than an ontology
of properties represented by numbers and vectors.21
3.4 A Vector in Hilbert Space
The final ontological interpretation of the wave function takes the abstract Hilbert
space more seriously. Recall that the wave function is represented as a vector in
Hilbert space, and the Schrödinger equation can be represented as an equation for
vector rotation in that space. Carroll and Singh (2018) suggest that Hilbert space is
the fundamental space, and the wave function is just a vector in that space. Physical
goings-on in the world will correspond to some particular directions the vector is
pointing at.
Since the Everettian interpretation of QM is the most natural place for this view,
Carroll and Singh (2018) call this approach Mad-Dog Everettianism. In their words,
the label is “to emphasize that it is as far as we can imagine taking the program of
stripping down quantum mechanics to its most pure, minimal elements.”
It is already difficult to recover ordinary objects from configuration space. It
is even more difficult to recover them from Hilbert space. For one thing, there is
no space-time structure in Hilbert space. The state of the world corresponds to
a vector, which is just like every other vector. How can anything familiar, such
as space, time, and ordinary objects, come out of a vector in a high-dimensional
Hilbert space? Like Albert (1996), Carroll and Singh propose that the answer lies in
the structure of the Hamiltonian operator. The Hamiltonian provides a privileged
way to decompose the total Hilbert space into smaller spaces, which may explain
the emergent structure.22 Carroll and Singh’s proposal is more speculative than
the high-dimensional field interpretation, since Hilbert space is more abstract than
21See Monton (2006) and Monton (2013) for another view that interprets the wave function as
properties of physical systems.
22Their analysis is restricted to locally finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. See Cotler et al. (2017) and
Bao et al. (2017) for more details.
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configuration space. However, it is in part motivated by the non-fundamentality
of space-time in several theories of quantum gravity. As such, it could be a fruitful
project to explore.
4 Nomological Interpretations
According to the previous ontological interpretations, the wave function is part of
the fundamental material ontology of the world. The wave function in quantum
mechanics is given the same status as particles and fields in classical mechanics. In
contrast, nomological interpretations hold that the wave function is nomological,
i.e. on a par with laws of nature. In this section, I survey two kinds of nomological
interpretations of the wave function: the strong nomological interpretations and the
weak nomological interpretations.
These interpretations are most compelling from a Bohmian point of view. How-
ever, they might be adaptable for some versions of GRW theories and Everettian
theories with additional ontologies.
4.1 Strong Nomological Interpretations
The guiding idea of nomological interpretations is that the wave function is on a
par with laws of nature (Dürr et al. (1996), Goldstein and Teufel (2001), Goldstein
and Zanghì (2013)). To appreciate the strong nomological interpretations, it would
be helpful to review the status of the Hamiltonian function in classical mechanics.
As mentioned in §2.1, the Hamiltonian equations (1) govern the motion of classical
particles in physical space, represented by a curve in phase space. The Hamiltonian
function is the generator of such motion. It encodes the total energy of the system.
In one of the more familiar cases, it is a short hand for the kinetic energy term
and the pair-wise interactions of the particles (including gravitational, electric, and
magnetic interactions). We can write out H explicitly as a function (of position and
momentum) on the right hand sides of the equations. For the Hamiltonian equations
to be simple laws of nature, H has to be a simple function. In this sense, we give H
a nomological interpretation. Although it is a function on phase space, we do not
treat it as part of the material ontology.
Let us now consider Bohmian mechanics. In this theory, the guidance equation
governs the motion of particles in physical space, represented by a curve in config-
uration space. The wave function is the generator of such motion. Moreover, there
is no back reaction from the particles to the wave function. If the wave function
turns out to be a simple function that is somehow fixed by the theory, then we can
write out Ψ explicitly as a function (of configuration variables) on the right hand
side of the equation. In that case, we can give it an analogous nomological inter-
pretation. Although it is a function on configuration space, we can treat it as not
part of the ontology but only part of the law system. I call this the strong nomological
interpretation, for it affords the same status to the wave function as it does to the clas-
sical Hamiltonian function. Just as both Humeans and non-Humeans about laws
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of nature can embrace the nomological interpretation of the Hamiltonian function
in classical mechanics, both Humeans and non-Humeans can embrace the strong
nomological interpretation of the wave function.
However, the analogy between the Hamiltonian function in classical mechanics
and the wave function in Bohmian mechanics is not perfect. While the Hamiltonian
function is time-independent (it does not change over time), the wave function is
typically time-dependent (it changes over time). For something to be nomological or
to be like a fundamental law, one might expect it to be time-independent. However,
there are reasons to be optimistic. Dürr et al. (1996), Goldstein and Teufel (2001),
and Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) have offered one. When we eventually extend
quantum mechanics to quantum gravity, the wave function of the universe may
turn out to be time-independent. This is seen in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation of
canonical quantum gravity:
HˆΨ = 0 (11)
If we understand (11) as telling us about the time evolution of the wave function,
then it tells us that the wave function does not change over time, i.e. it is time-
independent.23 It is worth emphasizing that a time-independent universal wave
function does not entail that there is no change in the universe (cf: the problem of
time in quantum gravity). In the Bohmian theory, given a time-independent wave
function, the particles can still move in a non-trivial way, since a time-independent
wave function can generate a non-trivial velocity field in configuration space.
The strong nomological interpretation faces some challenges. First, it is an
open question whether the Wheeler-DeWitt equation governs the universal wave
function. For example, there are research programs in quantum gravity that do
not presuppose it. Second, since the wave function does not change over time, it
requires some revisions about how we think about the arrow of time.24
Why should fundamental laws be time-independent? One might appeal to
one’s intuition that laws are eternal and unchanging. But I think a better reason is
that time-independent laws are more likely to be simple, and simplicity is the more
fundamental consideration.25 A time-dependent function may be more complicated
than a time-independent one. And if a wave function Ψ is time-independent, as
23Since the Schrödinger equation governs how the wave function changes over time, it is to be
treated not as a fundamental equation but only as an effective equation—describing the behavior of
subsystems.
24The problem is that in standard Boltzmannian quantum statistical mechanics, the arrow of time
is associated with the increase of entropy of the quantum system, which is a property of the wave
function. If the universal wave function is time-independent, then there is no increase of Boltzmann
entropy. Perhaps the Bohmian approach can help by providing an alternative definition of entropy
(or “effective entropy”) in terms of particle configurations.
25Here I am supposing that the demand for simplicity of the fundamental laws is neutral between
Humeanism and non-Humeanism about laws of nature. For Humeans, theoretical virtues such as
simplicity and informativeness (and the balance of the two) are constitutive of some facts being
Humean laws of nature (that are the best summaries of the Humean mosaic). For non-Humeans,
simplicity and informativeness are our epistemic guides to discover which facts are non-Humean
laws. Both parties, it seems to me, should respect the pre-theoretical intuitions that fundamental
laws should be as simple as possible. And the complexity of some principle is a serious strike against
it being a fundamental law.
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suggested in (11), then Ψ presumably has many symmetries, so that the different
contributions under time-evolution will cancel out. Such symmetries may ensure
that the wave function is simple. For example, a translationally invariant function
on physical space can only be a constant function, which is relatively simple.26
However, if simplicity is the more fundamental desideratum, we may consider
whether time-independence is only a defeasible guide and whether there may be
simple yet time-dependent laws.
Can we find a simple (but maybe time-dependent) quantum state that plays the
same role as the classical Hamiltonian? An example can be found in Chen (2018b).
Chen proposes a choice of the initial quantum state that is as simple as the choice of
the low-entropy macrostate specified in the Past Hypothesis (Albert 2000). The Past
Hypothesis has been taken to be a candidate fundamental law of nature.27 If the
Past Hypothesis is simple enough to be a law, then Chen’s quantum state is simple
enough to be nomological. However, in that approach, the fundamental quantum
state is a mixed state rather than a pure state (it has to be represented by a density
matrix rather than a wave function). Moreover, the generator of motion becomes
time-dependent.
The strong nomological interpretation is most compelling in the Bohmian frame-
work. However, In Everettian and GRW theories with additional ontologies, it may
also be possible to make a case for the strong nomological interpretation.
4.2 Weak Nomological Interpretations
The literature on the nomological interpretation of the wave function is expanding.
However, much of that is directed at a weaker thesis, which I call the weak nomological
interpretation. On that view, the wave function Ψ does not need to be like the
classical Hamiltonian to fit into the law system. In particular, Ψ does not need to
be time-independent or simple. This interpretation recommends a weaker criterion
for being nomological. The idea is most plausible in some extended Humean
framework. In the original Humean framework, laws of nature are the axioms
of the best system that summarizes the mosaic. In Loewer (2001), the Humean
framework has been extended to allow for deterministic “chances.” In Hall (2015),
it has been further extended to allow intrinsic properties such as mass and charge
to be non-fundamental and to be merely part of the best system.
According to the weak nomological interpretation (Humean version), what is
fundamental is just matter (particles or fields) in the four-dimensional spacetime,
and the wave function is just a dynamical variable that assists in a simple and
informative summary of the mosaic. See Miller (2014), Esfeld (2014), Bhogal and
Perry (2015), Callender (2015), and Esfeld and Deckert (2017). Although the wave
function is part of the best system, it does not need to be time-independent. More-
26Relatedly, Allori (2017) has proposed a new argument for nomological interpretations based on
symmetry principles.
27See discussions in Feynman (2017), Albert (2000), Callender (2004), Loewer (2007), Wallace (2011,
2012) and Loewer (2016).
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over, it does not need to be simple simpliciter. It just needs to be the simplest one
among all competitors. Even though the exact specification of the wave function is
complicated, the best system involving the wave function might still be the simplest
overall. Albert (p.c.), Maudlin (p.c.), and Dewar (2017) have raised the worry that
the complete specification of particle trajectories, which will form another system,
seems to postulate much less information than the wave function. This is because
the particle trajectories form a single curve in configuration space, while the wave
function assigns values to every point in configuration space. Moreover, they have
raised the worry that the wave function does not supervene on the particle trajec-
tories, since prima facie the particle trajectories do not determine the exact values of
the wave function. However, it is true that physicists who have access only to facts
about the locations of pointers and experimental instruments nonetheless postulate
wave functions to make accurate explanations and predictions, and they often agree
on the exact wave function of the system. So the best system comparisons and the
issue about supervenience may be more complicated than the debate has assumed.
At any rate, the weak nomological interpretation demands less of the wave
function of the universe. It does not need to be a time-independent function, a
simple function, or a function determined in a simple way. It can be time-dependent
and highly complex, as long as it is the simplest among all the choices. One could
argue that the weak nomological interpretation is less realist than the previous
approaches,28 but it could still be realist if the extended Humean framework can be
understood as a realist view about laws and properties. So far the weak nomological
interpretation has only been defended in the extended Humean framework. It is an
open question whether it can be made plausible in some non-Humean framework.
5 The Sui Generis Interpretation
It is possible to be not persuaded by any of the above strategies. The high-
dimensional field interpretation and Hilbert space interpretation require sophis-
ticated stories about the emergence of the apparent three-dimensional objects and
ordinary space-time. The low-dimensional multi-field interpretation and the sub-
system property interpretation may seem to be trying too hard to squeeze the wave
function into familiar ontological categories.
Perhaps the lesson of quantum mechanics is that the wave function does not fit
into any familiar categories of things; it is a new kind of entity. Perhaps it is neither
ontological nor nomological. In that case, the wave function has its own category
of existence that is distinct from anything we have considered. In other words, the
wave function is ontologically sui generis. Maudlin (2013) suggests that we should
28One argument is that the weak nomological interpretation is “too cheap,” i.e. too easy to satisfy.
We can presumably extend it to any piece of problematic ontology and put it in the law system.
There is no difficulty, for example, of extending the interpretation to classical physics and move the
classical electromagnetic fields from fundamental ontology to the law system. So the fundamental
ontology will only consist in particles, not particles plus fields. That would be an unwelcome result,
as we can test whether an interpretive framework is realist enough by testing whether it affirms, in
classical field theory, the ontological reality of fields.
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Interpretation BM GRW0 GRWm GRWf S0 Sm HD LD
High-Dimensional Field 3 3 7 7 3 7 3 7
Low-Dimensional Multi-field 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 3
Properties of Systems 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 3
Vector in Hilbert Space ? 3 ? ? 3 ? 3 7
Strongly Nomological 3 ? ? ? ? 3 3 3
Weakly Nomological 3 ? 3 3 ? 3 3 3
Sui Generis 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1: The first column lists all the realist interpretations reviewed in this article. In the first row,
we have the main solutions to the quantum measurement problem: BM (Bohmian mechanics with
a particle ontology), GRW0 (GRW theory without additional ontologies), GRWm (GRW theory with
a mass-density ontology), GRWf (GRW theory with a flash ontology), S0 (Everettian theory without
additional ontologies), and Sm (Everettian theory with a mass-density ontology). “HD” stands for
the view that the fundamental physical space is high-dimensional (1080 dimensions in configuration
space fundamentalism or possibly infinity in Hilbert space fundamentalism), and “LD” stands for
the view that the fundamental space is low-dimensional (3 dimensions of ordinary physical space).
We mark their compatibility with a check (compatible), a cross (incompatible), or a question mark
(unknown compatibility).
be open to that possibility.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have surveyed three kinds of realist interpretations of the wave
function: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis
interpretation. (See Table 1 for a summary.) A century after the discovery of
quantum mechanics, although there is no consensus on what it means, we have
made significant progress in constructing several realist interpretations. Almost
every interpretation requires further developments, and it is too early to say which
one is the best or the most fruitful. It is also too early to think that those are
exhaustive of all the options available to the realist. In all likelihood, there will be
other ways to think about the wave function from the realist perspective that we
have never considered.29
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